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1 Introduction 
 
In going on strike at a transmission factory, workers here have Honda by the jugular [vein], 
although it was not entirely clear at the employees’ dormitory … that they realized this. 
Transmission factories are the most expensive auto plants of all to build … The factory 
here supplies four Honda plants in China, all of which have been shut down. (New York 
Times, 28 May 2010)  
 
The interdependent nature of factories in the car industry, exacerbated by local and global just-
in-time supply practices, can make companies peculiarly vulnerable to stoppages in one factory. 
In May and June 2010 this was illustrated by the series of strikes, for large pay increases, in the 
Chinese factories of the Japanese multinational company Honda (particularly that in the Nanhai 
district of Foshan city, Guangdong province, 100 miles north-west of Hong Kong); these were 
followed by strikes at Toyota-affiliated factories in China. When the Nanhai Honda strike 
 2 
created shortages of gearboxes, leading to the shutdown of all Honda’s four Chinese assembly 
factories, news of it even reached The Times (28 May 2010) and the Economist (3 June 2010) in 
Britain. For two days the Chinese authorities, playing on anti-Japanese sentiment, unusually 
allowed domestic news coverage of the strike, thus ensuring its notoriety within China itself. The 
method of ending the strike by a negotiated settlement with the workforce, and the string of 
copycat actions that its success generated, has triggered a steady stream of academic comment 
(e.g., Chang, 2010; Hui, 2011; Lau, 2012; Friedman, 2012, 2013; Chan and Hui, 2012, 2014; 
Chang and Brown, 2013; Gray and Jang, 2014).  
 Multinational companies are not allowed to assemble cars or manufacture components in 
China, except through joint venture partnerships with domestic firms. In 1983, when the first 
joint venture opened, only 5,200 passenger cars were produced in China. This had grown to 
220,000 by 1993 and to 2.3 million in 2004 (Chin, 2010: 4). With China’s accession to the 
World Trade Organization in December 2001, ‘production skyrocketed’ (Anderson, 2012: 15) as 
protectionist measures were gradually reduced and prices fell. Its annual car production overtook 
Japan’s in 2009 to become the largest in the world and the industry has carried on growing at a 
phenomenal rate. In 2010 Chinese factories produced 13.9 million cars, which had risen to 18.1 
million three years later (OICA). All the big automobile multinationals now have a presence in 
China, with Honda setting up joint venture assembly companies in 1998 and 2003 (Anderson, 
2012: 268). The Nanhai Honda component factory (a joint venture established in 2007) operated 
a three-shift system and employed a preponderantly young migrant workforce of about 1,800 
(90% male in 2011), the majority (different sources give different percentages) of whom were 
interns (average age 18), third-year students from technical colleges, recruited every year, and 
paid a lower wage than regular workers. The strike was an on–off affair, with varying 
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proportions of the workforce involved. A limited stoppage on 17 May 2010 was followed by a 
partial strike on 20–21 May, no overtime (to make up for lost production) worked on the 
weekend of 22–23 May, effectively a full strike between 24 May and 1 June, then a resumption 
of work until final negotiations on 4 June were accompanied by a small stoppage. After 
establishing a suitable framework with which to analyse the strike, the rest of the article charts its 
course. 
  
2 Theory, context and method 
 
While the number of strikes is historically extremely low in Europe and North America, strikes 
in the new ‘workshop of the world’ – China – are becoming more common (van der Velden et 
al., 2007; Chan, 2009; China Labour Bulletin, 2014; Elfstrom and Kuruvilla, 2014). Even before 
the increased marketisation of the Chinese economy, strikes were not unknown. Since the early 
1980s there has been a spate of ‘mass incidents’ recorded, though the term ‘strike’ often 
encompassed actions by workers after they had lost their jobs. Such incidents included blocking 
highways and besieging local government buildings, particularly when workers were laid off 
from state-owned enterprises (Lee, 2000: 43, 48–53; Chan, 2010: 24–42; Pringle, 2011: 77–81). 
Labour shortages and greater experience of the factory system led to a ‘normalization’ of strikes 
in the 2000s, and ‘strikes and picket lines have gradually replaced sit-ins and marches’ (Pringle, 
2011: 103). 
 Pringle (2011: 103–4) has used Hobsbawm’s term ‘collective bargaining by riot’ (1964: 
7) to describe the ‘short strikes and protests [that] have become an extremely prompt and 
effective way of redressing … grievances’ in China, where workers have ‘developed a very good 
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idea of what they can get away with and how far they can go’. Chan and Hui have taken this 
further and identify ‘collective bargaining by riot’ as a transition between ‘collective consultation 
as a formality’ and ‘party state-led collective bargaining’ (2014: 222). The latter authors 
specifically cite the Honda strike as ‘perfectly’ exemplifying ‘how the collective defiance of 
Chinese workers has forced management to … the negotiation table, a situation similar to 
Hobsbawm’s idea’.  
 This use of Hobsbawm’s term ‘collective bargaining by riot’ is inventive but not 
appropriate. Hobsbawm employed the term to describe how some groups of (mainly eighteenth-
century) British workers used wrecking or burning of machinery as the most effective method 
available to them at the time to put pressure on employers. ‘Riot’ encompassed a ‘whole 
complex of activities’ in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It often succeeded in 
achieving an acceptable outcome in an era before national trade unions and at a point where any 
form of direct bargaining was generally impossible in Britain (Hobsbawm, 1964: 7–10, 16–17). 
In other words, ‘collective bargaining by riot’ was an early substitute for what eventually became 
collective bargaining without riot. Chan and Hui are actually describing relatively peaceful 
strikes, usually (as at Nanhai Honda) confined to a single workplace, unlike Hobsbawm’s riots 
which usually embraced several employers and involved local communities. In consequence, 
Friedman and Lee (2010: 521) have observed that protest in China ‘is still fundamentally cellular 
in nature in the sense that the “cells” are not combining to form “tissues”.’ But the second 
generation of migrant workers ‘has refused to remain quiet’ (Pun and Lu, 2010: 499) and 
migrants are becoming increasingly ‘better informed’ and open to ‘nonviolent protest activity’ as 
they develop informal ‘urban ties’ among themselves (Becker, 2012: 1381–1382). 
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 Interest, by academics and activists alike, in the Nanhai Honda strike has focused on the 
role of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), how its workplace unions can be 
made more representative, and the prospects for collective bargaining in China. While 
acknowledging the constraints on industrial action in China, most commentators have treated the 
Nanhai Honda strike as relatively unproblematic. Yet the development of the strike was far from 
straightforward as it ebbed and flowed, with changing levels of involvement by the workforce. 
By drawing on relevant texts within the academic literature on strikes – an approach not taken to 
date – its various stages and features can be charted. The starting point is to clarify the status of 
the strike. 
Unions that are financially, organisationally, and ideologically ‘independent’ of 
employers, and of the Communist Party and the Chinese state, are banned in China while the 
ACFTU, and its constituent parts, has a clear anti-strike stance. Some commentators have even 
suggested that the ACFTU is not even a trade union (Taylor and Li, 2007). Martin (1989: 145) 
categorised the Chinese trade-union movement as of the ‘state-ancillary’ type in that it consists 
of a single confederation, ‘ultimately subject … to the control of the ruling political party and/or 
the state’. Such a confederation and its trade unions ‘tend to display an overriding interest in 
maintaining and improving production’. With odd exceptions, such movements ‘never officially 
initiate, or endorse, strike action’ (Martin, 1989: 152–4). This situation has not changed to date 
(Financial Times, 8 April 2014; Lee 2014). The union’s ‘task’, when confronted by strikes, is ‘to 
defuse the situation’ (Chen, 2010: 105). The Nanhai Honda workplace union had been 
established in 2008 – but Honda management appointed its officials, who were all management 
staff, and its chair was the deputy director of the administration department (China News Weekly 
(CNW), 1 June 2010). Most workers were members, as a five-yuan monthly fee gave access to a 
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300-yuan annual ‘welfare’ card; the union’s other main function was to organise day-trips and 
entertainment. Using an analogy from Francoist Spain (where independent unions were also 
prohibited), the Nanhai Honda workplace union was typical in China in being an 
‘unrepresentative representation body’ (Amsden, 1972: 117). Friedman (2012: 462) has more 
recently borrowed Max Weber’s term ‘appropriated representation’ to explain the situation 
where the ACFTU’s ‘representative claim [to speak for workers] is “appropriated” rather than 
earned”.’ 
The Honda strike has been described as a ‘wildcat’ (Carter, 2010a; Zhang, 2015: 1): it 
was not only not supported by the union (‘unofficial’, as we would understand the term in 
Britain) but actively opposed by it. Yet neither ‘wildcat’ nor ‘unofficial’ is helpful in the Chinese 
context. Chen (2010: 105) has argued that, because of the ACFTU’s role, ‘workers’ collective 
action in China is always launched by unorganized workers’ (added emphasis) (also see Liu and 
Li, 2014: 86), so the Honda strike’s status is probably best approached as non-union. While a 
whole study was once devoted to output restriction by unorganised workers (Mathewson, 1969 
[1931]), the extensive Western literature on strikes rarely covers strikes by them unless union 
recognition is involved. But unorganised workers in China cannot create or join an independent 
union. So in the country with the world’s largest employed workforce, strikers face problems not 
currently encountered in other developed industrial economies. 
Ross (1954: 24) has indicated that, historically, unorganised strikers in England and the 
USA ‘were thrown together into an ad hoc organization … which often disappeared when the 
strike had ended’. Attempts to study the strike process of organised, let alone unorganised, 
workers are not that common. Karsh’s (1982 [1958]) detailed study of one strike, to secure a 
union contract, stands out but it is in the work of an even earlier generation (Hiller, 1928) that we 
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find what is still the most useful account of a ‘processual model of strikes’ (Hartley et al., 1983: 
11–12), one that can be used also to analyse strikes of unorganised ‘non-union’ workers. Hiller’s 
book, a ‘classic study’ (Kelly and Nicholson, 1980: 870), was based on the already substantial 
literature available at the time, drawing on several countries (particularly the USA and UK) and 
ranging over a long time period. He noted that ‘every industrial group which begins to organize, 
repeats, in some respects, the behaviour characteristic of … early labor movements’ (Hiller, 
1928: 72), which should make his observations particularly relevant to the Chinese workers’ 
situation of today.  
Hiller (1928: 10) identified a number of separate processes in a strike: organisation, 
mobilisation, maintaining group morale, controlling strikebreakers, neutralising the employer’s 
manoeuvres, manipulating ‘public opinion’, and demobilisation. The introduction to Hiller’s 
book (1928: ix) suggested that he saw in strikes ‘a cycle of typical events which take place in a 
more or less regular and predictable way’, and Hiller himself  (1928: 10) referred to ‘successive 
phases of the strike cycle’. But the various strike processes identified by Hiller do not all 
necessarily occur in a fixed order and often overlap in practice. Yet they do provide a 
particularly helpful framework for understanding non-union strikes and will be used to structure 
an account of the Nanhai Honda strike. Chen (2010: 122) has suggested that, in China, ‘Without 
organization and rules to follow for strikes, the behavioural pattern of worker action can be 
volatile, undisciplined and unpredictable’. But the rest of this article will show that the behaviour 
of the workers and the employer in the Nanhai Honda strike conform remarkably closely to the 
pattern of western strikes observed by Hiller nearly a century ago, once the absence of 
independent unions is allowed for.  
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Some of the roots of the recent literature on mobilisation (see Kelly, 1998) can be found 
in Hiller (1928: 49), who described workers ‘creating interpretations of the situation which 
encourage action: supplying justifications for striking and minimizing the hazards’. In their study 
of a vehicle assembly plant, Batstone et al. (1978: 46–62) built on Hiller’s notion that workers 
create a ‘rationale’ for strikes. They found what they called vocabularies ‘in support of’ and ‘in 
opposition to’ strike action and also ‘collectivist and individualistic vocabularies’. They were 
describing what has been termed ‘vocabularies of motive’, a concept which found its way into 
sociology through Mills (1940: 909). Eldridge (1973: 172–181) explicitly referred to 
‘vocabularies of motive’ when discussing industrial conflict and the term has since become a key 
concept in the literature on ‘framing’ (Benford and Snow, 2000: 617–618). The rationale for 
striking for higher wages at Nanhai Honda was initially framed only in the language of injustice. 
In the course of the strike it then incorporated anti-Japanese sentiment that the authorities had 
encouraged by allowing the strike’s coverage by domestic news media and, then, after an attack 
by union ‘thugs’ (Lau, 2012: 505), the strikers also framed their dispute in the language of 
dignity. By contrast, the Honda management continually framed the workers’ action as illegal. 
The industry in which a strike occurs has a significant effect on its form. Under Dunlop’s 
(1958) schema, the ‘market’ and ‘technical’ contexts of the car industry are similar in all 
countries with car factories. This similarity has been intensified by the international reach of the 
limited number of companies in the industry and the competition between them in worldwide 
markets. Dunlop’s ‘power context’ – the national industrial relations system and the status of the 
industrial relations actors – varies between countries. The economic impact of car industry 
strikes shows similarities between countries and over time. The market and technical contexts 
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would restrict the range of options available to employers in reaction to such strikes; the national 
power context would constrain or facilitate their access to particular options. 
Silver (2003: 92) has emphasised car workers’ ‘workplace bargaining power’, namely the 
‘disruptive power that continuous flow production puts in the hands of workers’. This has 
become greater as a result of (local, national and global) just-in-time systems, allowing Silver 
(2003: 69) to conclude that ‘the main sites of automobile industry expansion [particularly China 
now] still retain the characteristics that provoked and facilitated the historic waves of autoworker 
militancy, from the CIO struggles of the 1930s’ to the current day. This similarity over time and 
place means that, when analysing the Nanhai Honda strike of 2010, we can compare it with 
relatively little-known examples of non-union strikes in the early mass-production car industries 
of the UK and the US in the late 1920s and early 1930s. This makes for more fruitful 
comparisons than using examples from unionised workforces. 
 During the depths of the inter-war depression there were ‘spontaneous movements among 
unorganized automobile workers’ in Detroit, the heartland of the US industry. A number of 
strikes in 1933, particularly over wage cuts, led to employers quickly reinstating former wages. 
The most intractable dispute, of 6,000 workers at four Briggs (car-body) plants, led to important 
concessions but the strikers wanted further improvements and management recognition of an 
employee-elected shop committee. The company met an employees’ committee but made no 
further concessions and the strike eventually fizzled out (Fine, 1963: 27–9). 
 By contrast, there was a successful landmark strike of non-unionists at the Pressed Steel 
Company car body factory in Oxford, England, in 1934. A stoppage over wages by the night 
shift in the press shop led some strikers to approach the local Communist Party branch which 
advised them on how to proceed. The strikers leafleted the day shift and persuaded their own 
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department to cease work. They then marched through the factory, persuading others to stop, if 
only temporarily. Over the next few day and night shifts other groups decided to join the strike 
(sometimes because their work was running out – as would happen at Nanhai Honda). By now 
union recognition had been added to the list of demands. The management then shut the factory 
for several days. Mass picketing greeted the reopening of the factory and, although some workers 
returned, key workers did not. The company, under pressure for production from its customers 
(car-assembly factories – similar to the Nanhai Honda situation), settled within three days of its 
attempted restart and agreed to recognise unions (Lyddon, 1987: 635–8, 764–6; Lyddon, 1993). 
 The Nanhai Honda dispute was a textbook example of a ‘stay-in’ strike (Knowles, 1952: 
10–11). This tactic is different from an occupation strike, popularised by those at several General 
Motors factories in Flint, Michigan, in 1936–37; these factory occupations were referred to, at 
the time, as ‘sit-downs’, but this term also encompassed short strikes during a shift. In a stay-in 
strike, workers find it easier to maintain their unity and solidarity by remaining inside the plant 
during working hours, rather than risking exposing their weakness by picketing from outside. To 
avoid civil unrest, the Chinese authorities did not want the Honda strikers outside the factory, 
and this inadvertently strengthened the strikers’ position.  
One British example of the stay-in strike comes from the Austin, Birmingham, car 
factory in 1929. Here, in a dispute over a wage reduction, the mainly non-union workforce 
clocked in on a Monday but, according to the Engineering Employers’ Federation, they ‘did not 
start work but walked about, smoked, played cards, idled and … then verbally announced that 
they were on strike’. The company countered that it would shut the factory for a week if work 
was not resumed on the Wednesday. When the factory re-opened, workers clocked in but most 
again refused to work. The company then required them to obtain a permit from their foremen in 
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order to get work the next day or they would be considered to have discharged themselves. The 
strike committee abandoned the ‘stay-in’ tactic and decided to picket from outside but strikers 
were thwarted by the police (Lyddon, 1987: 648–50). 
 Such historical examples of strikes of unorganised carworkers facilitate a greater 
understanding of some of the features of the Nanhai Honda strike. An account of this strike can 
be pieced together from contemporary (mainly American and Chinese) newspapers and pro-
labour outlets such as the China Labour Bulletin and IHLO (Hong Kong Liaison office of the 
ICFTU/GUF) reports. There is also a secondary literature (sometimes using interview evidence 
from strike participants). One of the authors was present at the final negotiations on 4 June 2010, 
as an assistant to Professor Chang Kai, the strikers’ legal adviser. A purposive sampling method 
was used to select twenty-one workers, spread across the different production departments of the 
factory, who were willing to talk about their experiences of the strike. They were interviewed 
between October 2010 and July 2012; quotes from eight of them are cited here (numbered 1–8). 
Some union officials were also interviewed but it was hard to contact, let alone to interview, any 
management staff. All interviewees’ identities remain anonymous. The strike was sufficiently 
long (nearly three weeks from the first stoppage to the final settlement) and well reported, to 
provide enough information to analyse it satisfactorily using Hiller’s categories.  
 
3 The strike 
 
A number of factors fed into Nanhai Honda workers’ dissatisfaction with their wages: staff 
brought in from Japan were earning ‘about 50 times what local Chinese workers receive’ (New 
York Times, 2 June 2010); regular staff were paid significantly less than at Honda’s Chinese 
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assembly factories; interns earned less than regular workers; wages were far below the industrial 
average (China Labour Bulletin, 2012: 6, fig. 2) and in sharp contrast to Honda’s profitability; 
finally, in April 2010, Honda did not match the increase in the local minimum wage. Dissatisfied 
workers asked for a pay rise, but the management ignored their mounting discontent. 
 
3.1 Preliminary organisation and mobilisation 
 
Before the strike can occur, a group capable of concerted action must be formed. (Hiller, 
1928: 25) 
 
‘Even a spontaneous strike has to be started by somebody’ (quoted in Hiller, 1928: 61). 
 
No workforce exists in isolation from the rest of society and there will always be workers who 
are aware, to however limited an extent, that the strike weapon could be used in their own 
situation. That applied in the China of the early twenty-first century despite there being no 
organisations that workers could join or create in order to mobilise for such a strike. From 
personal contacts but mostly from electronic media, many workers would know that strikes 
happen in China and over what issues. Even in Honda, for example, there had been two-day 
strikes, for a pay rise, in two component factories in 2006 and 2007 (South China Morning Post 
(SCMP), 30 May 2010). Our interview evidence suggests that, at Nanhai Honda, workers in 2008 
and 2009 had discussed strikes as a way to improve their low wages. One source claims there 
were four strikes in 2009 and nine strikes between January and March 2010 in affiliated 
companies and suppliers of Honda in Guangdong province’s auto parts hubs of Guangzhou, 
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Foshan and Zhongshan cities (IHLO, 2010: 18–19); some Nanhai Honda workers may have been 
aware of one or more of these. 
 There were many strands feeding into the decision to strike. One source suggests that two 
of the more experienced workers sought out Lao Zhang,1 ‘a citizen representative who had 
specifically represented workers in legal cases’. Lao Zhang suggested using a mediation 
procedure and that if the two handed out a leaflet in preparation for a strike this would give some 
bargaining leverage (Wang, 2011: 13–14). But for a strike to take place, some secret planning 
would be required: ‘The strategic value of secrecy … [is] that it averts a counter-move, such as 
discharge and intimidation’ (Hiller, 1928: 133). The strike instigators also had to be confident 
that enough workers would be prepared to join in to avoid the leaders being dismissed 
immediately the strike started; so, as well as a ‘small but critical mass’ (Kelly, 1998: 127) 
persuading others to take the initial action, there also had to be a sufficient ‘critical mass’ of 
strikers to make the action effective and to push the managers on to the defensive. 
Like Hiller, Hyman (1989: 111) among others has argued that ‘collective action by 
workers is impossible without some degree of leadership and organisation’. But the shop-floor 
leadership shown by workers standing up to supervisors or managers, as in Fantasia’s (1988: 84–
85) American example, is not possible in the Chinese situation – hence the need to organise 
outside the workplace.  It seems that 23-year-old Tan Guocheng (who had worked at Honda for 
two and a half years) could only persuade others to join him if he took the lead himself. 
According to him, there were only ‘random talks on the shuttle bus to work’ until a week before 
the 17 May stoppage when fifteen workers from Tan’s workshop met one night to discuss the 
plan. China News Weekly (2 June 2010) suggested eventually twenty workers were involved in 
preparing for the strike. Tan had handed in his resignation notice on 29 April, as had 20-year-old 
                                                 
1 A pseudonym. 
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Xiao Lang, from another production line, who agreed to help to lead the strike, so both felt they 
had nothing to lose. Xiao also created an internet chat room on QQ (a Chinese instant messaging 
software service) the night before the strike started.  
 As Hiller (1928: 66) notes: simple examples of ‘tactics used in beginning strikes … are 
those which are arranged to occur at a given signal, such as waving an emblem, blowing a 
whistle, giving a secret sign’. Where there are moving assembly lines, there is an obvious device, 
so, early during their morning shift on Monday 17 May, Tan and Xiao pressed their nearest 
emergency buttons (International Herald Tribune (IHT), 15 June 2000; New York Times, 17 June 
2000). A siren sounded and the two workers called out: ‘Don’t work for such low wages!’ They 
were unable to get workers from other shops in the factory to join them. The fifty or so strikers2 
stuck to their original plan, ‘to stage a silent demonstration on the [factory] basketball court’. 
News spread of the stoppage and the absence of the striking workers led to the production line 
eventually stopping: ‘the majority of the workforce had been passively sucked into the strike, 
although they still stood by their production lines’. By lunchtime there were about 100 strikers 
(CNW, 2 June 2010) and, later, possibly a maximum of 150 from across the factory on that shift 
(ILHO, 2010), some of the others being apprehensive about the consequences of taking action. 
 At noon the strikers went to the dining hall and found a company notice for them to 
write suggestions on six white notice boards, which they did. After their demands had been 
translated into Japanese the managers promised to respond by Friday 21 May, four days 
later. At 3.00 pm the afternoon shift started work as normal (CNW, 2 June 2010). Although it 
was later suggested that the strike ‘evolved into an essentially “leaderless” movement, 
coordinated mainly via text messages sent on mobile phones’ (Straits Times (Singapore), 10 
June 2010), the strikers seemed to be organised in different departments by a number of 
                                                 
2 IHT, 2 June 2010, suggests only twenty workers initially struck.  
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workers who had sufficient courage or confidence and fellow workers’ trust. Despite 
production resuming, ‘many workers claimed that productivity dropped’, with an axle 
worker indicating that they were polishing only half the normal number. For the first 
negotiations, on Thursday 20 and Friday 21 May, two representatives were elected – by 
show of hands or popular acclaim – from each of the five main production divisions. One 
source suggests they were accompanied by some team leaders. The only role of the 
workplace union was ‘to provide a platform of communication between the two sides’ of 
management and strikers (CNW, 2 June 2010).  
Interview evidence indicates that, when workers heard that the management had ‘not 
seriously’ considered their request for a large wage increase, they ‘were so angry’ (interview 1) 
that the strike was called again just like ‘a hundred responses to a single call’ (interview 2). A 
partial strike started at 8.00 pm on the evening of Thursday 20 May, followed by disruption most 
of Friday, though the company suggested that the strike only restarted on the evening of Friday 
21 May instead (IHLO, 2010). The company and the union agreed to give their answer on 
Monday 24 May. The workplace union chair’s immediate role was to remonstrate with strikers to 
return to work, and he was in ‘close communication’ with the factory manager during the 
meeting with workers’ representatives on 24 May (Chan and Hui, 2014: 229). During the strike 
he ‘tailed the general manager everywhere as if he was the manager’s bodyguard’ (Lau, 2012: 
505; added emphasis). 
 Most retrospective accounts suggest that the original and continuing wage demand was 
for an extra 800 yuan a month (on top of the existing wage of about 1,500 yuan for regular 
workers), but this goes against the experience that ‘In most spontaneous strikes … the aims are 
defined after work has been suspended’ (Hiller, 1928: 80, n.1). One source suggests the workers 
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had initially asked for a 200–400 yuan rise (China Labour Bulletin, 15 September 2010), another 
that it was 500 yuan (The Times, 28 May 2010). A Nanhai Honda worker later explained: ‘After 
production stopped, … Japanese companies … were all increasing salaries by 300 or 400, 500 
yuan, so everyone said, that’s no good, we are on strike … so since everyone else’s demands are 
going up, we want 800 yuan from them’ (China Labour Bulletin, 15 September 2010). This 
demand, 800 yuan for all workers, was not made until 27 May and was designed to counter the 
differential offers the management were making to regular workers and interns (Support 
Statement, 3 June 2010). 
 Workers were asked to report for overtime over the first weekend to make up for 
production lost that week. Strike leader Tan countered this by renewing the call for striking but it 
was later announced through loudspeakers on Saturday 22 May that he and the other strike 
initiator, Xiao, were dismissed – one week earlier than their official leaving date. This was 
intended to decapitate and intimidate the leadership of the strike but it seems to have rebounded 
on management by actually increasing support for the strike. On the Sunday, 23 May, with 
managers taking photographs of strikers, the latter put on surgical masks. The next day managers 
tried to stop a workers’ demonstration around the factory yard by pushing them back to their 
workshops. Japanese and Chinese managers took pictures of the strikers. ‘We took pictures of 
them too by mobile phones. We tried to stop them and run to them, but they shouted “you come 
here!” … Then we had our face masks on because we feared our faces being identified in the 
photos’ (interview 3). 
‘Managers tried to separate us by locking us in different rooms. The security guards 
couldn’t help but only told us not to destroy anything’ (interview 2). Strikers called for more 
workers to join in their demonstration: 
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There were many student trainees, just recruited from schools, who were inside a training 
room. We shouted to them … They were brain-washed by the company in those 
meetings, although many of them didn’t want to be there. As a result, some of them also 
came out to be with us … We walked all over the place including the basketball courts, 
sometimes sitting on the ground. Sometimes the security guards came to us and 
whispered to us privately: ‘your strike is good, go on’. (interview 2). 
 
 The strike continued through the week. Honda shut its two assembly plants in Guangdong 
province on 24 May and its two in Hubei province on 26 May. It was reported that Honda’s  
CEO, Takanobu Ito, even flew in to find a solution (China Auto Web, 29 May 2010). On 
Wednesday 26 May, ‘Management wanted to constrain us inside the workshops by doing a 
register but we eventually went out to the courtyard after 3.00 pm’ (interview 3). ‘They locked in 
some colleagues to prevent them from going outside. It was like private custody’ (interview 2). 
During the evening of Thursday 27 May, a lawyer came into the factory yard to meet the strikers, 
saying ‘he’d like to help … claiming he wasn’t from the Japanese side and he was sent by a 
union organisation … He said he wanted to be one of our strike team’. He then said ‘not to strike 
because it was “illegal”. His point was to stop us’. He spoke on his mobile phone in Japanese: 
‘We didn’t know what he was talking about, but we did know he wasn’t trustful. I asked: “show 
your ID card to see whether you are Japanese or Chinese” … Then he took out a lawyer’s 
certificate before he went away’ (interview 2). 
 The argument that the strike was illegal was to be used again by the company but the 
current law in China ‘neither explicitly provides … nor forbids’ the right to strike (Chang, 2013: 
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136), so the Honda strike was not illegal – and the strikers were not intimidated by any threats to 
the contrary. 
 
3.2 Maintaining morale and unity 
 
Parades, demonstrations, and assemblies have been features of the strike since its earliest 
beginnings. Marching, with its unison of action, is admirably designed to create rapport. 
Singing, concerted derision, and applause … develop consensus … Without them no strike, 
particularly one by inexperienced persons, can be maintained long … Rallying calls, 
embodied in oratory, poetry, and song, steel the will to carry on … Morale is aided by 
appropriating patriotic and other sentiments and tying them to the strike (added emphasis; 
Hiller, 1928: 84, 89, 91). 
 
Unusually, almost all the events of the strike unfolded inside the factory gates, so any parades 
were not public but were visible to any reporters at the factory gates (from about 27 May) and 
transmissible by the strikers through social media. When, on 24 May, the company had conceded 
some minor changes to remuneration which did not affect aggregate pay, this apparently brought 
out the whole workforce (interns and regular workers), chanting ‘fight to the end’ (ILHO, 2010). 
Over the next week the strikers regularly marched around the factory yard, chanting slogans, 
such as ‘we need a pay rise’, or sang the national anthem (an example of Hiller’s ‘patriotic’ 
sentiments) and ‘Unity Is Power’, a popular song in the Maoist era. When a number of the 
strikers felt bored from marching, some wrote new slogans in the dining room and took these out 
to the rest of the group (interview 4). More generally, they used mobile phone calls, text 
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messages and internet online chat-rooms to communicate news to each other. A local online 
forum, Tiantianxin, was used to post messages as it was convenient and relatively secure, and 
‘we could only rely on the internet, no other way’ (interview 5). Another online community, the 
QQ group, attracted most strikers because it ‘looked quite confidential during the strike’ 
(interview 6).  
 
 In the QQ group some of us called each other as comrade, and recited [founder of the 
Chinese Nationalist Party] Sun Yet Sen’s famous phrase before his death, ‘The revolution is 
yet to be successful, and comrades must continue their diligence’ … We have been 
influenced by these revolutionary thoughts since we were young, and we also used anti-
Japanese slogans borrowed from the war era to inspire each other to fight against the 
Japanese management. (interview 4) 
 
Anti-Japanese sentiment does not seem to have been a factor in the initial mobilisation for the 
strike but became an important way of framing opposition to the company as the strike 
developed. 
A guard told an American reporter that workers had been sitting on a double basketball 
court just inside the factory gate ‘for several hours each morning’ (IHT, 29 May 2010). At times 
they felt frustrated waiting for management’s reaction to their developing demands. ‘After all 
day marching and waiting without a clear outcome, we did … things to pass the time, sleeping, 
playing cards [as in the 1929 Austin strike] or mobile phones, but overall we were exhausted’ 
(interview 1). Their sense of solidarity developed along with the use of these communications. 
They also discussed their tactics when they stayed inside the factory yard or went back to their 
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dormitories where the mainly young unmarried men could sit together and register their 
resistance; in this case the dormitory system was not an instrument of company control (see 
Smith and Pun, 2006). The large number of interns had their own existing networks from college 
and this facilitated their level of participation in the strike. 
 One report suggested that, with so many young Chinese going to university and the low 
birth rate, there was a shortage of young people available for factory work, giving them some 
leverage (New York Times, 30 May 2010; more generally, also see Elfstrom and Kuruvilla, 2014: 
459–460). In line with this, a full-time worker told the SCMP (30 May 2010): ‘We are young and 
fearless because we have no family or economic responsibilities’. 
 
3.3 Controlling strikebreakers and neutralising the employers’ manoeuvres  
 
Monday morning is a critical time, for employers then make special efforts to break the 
strikers’ resistance (Hiller, 1928: 94). 
 
Although the authorities had allowed some domestic reporting of the strike, the company’s tactic 
of shutting workers in during their shift times avoided the strikers demonstrating in public. As 
the Economist (3 June 2010) reported, there was ‘no picketing, no clashes with police’. General 
Chinese hostility towards Japan ‘had made it harder to send in the police to break up strikes on 
behalf of Japanese managers’ (New York Times, 28 May 2010). This worked to the strikers’ 
advantage because their stay-in strike meant that they could effectively disrupt production inside 
the plant, without the need to expose publicly any weakness, such as non-strikers crossing picket 
lines. It made it easier to maintain their unity and morale, as they formed an even closer 
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community in the factory than in their scattered dormitories in different locations. Warner and 
Low (1947: 37) have shown how strikers going into a strike-hit factory to ‘work’ can talk non-
strikers out of continuing to work. In effect, the Nanhai Honda managers gave this facility to 
their own strikers, who were able more easily to persuade groups of workers to join them when 
the company periodically tried to break the strike. The Financial Times (11 June 2010) also 
suggested that, compared to many giant Chinese factories, the size of the Nanhai Honda 
workforce ‘made it relatively easy for staff to organise outside’ the official union. 
The company believed that the easiest way to break the strike was by threatening the 
interns.  In the third and last year of their study, these vocational college students were placed in 
the company for on-the-job training – but they found themselves ‘doing repetitive and low-
skilled work on the production line irrelevant to their learning in schools’. In the words of some 
Honda interns: ‘We agree absolutely this is a high-class looking sweatshop. The biggest pity is 
that we are buried here. We have learned nothing. The so-called training – it is something that 
anybody can learn and become proficient in it by spending a day or two on the production line’ 
(IHLO, 2010: 13). With such resentment against the company not uncommon, not enough interns 
were prepared to be cowed.  
Most sources suggest that an ‘Agreement to Internship’ was sent out on 27 May which 
authorised the company and the different vocational schools to terminate internships and college 
courses should interns ‘take the lead or participate in work-to-rule, and work stoppages’ (ILHO, 
2010: Appendix One). The principals of the affected colleges were summoned to meet their own 
student interns on Saturday 29 May. Most of these meetings broke up with no resolution and 
some students even walked out of them (CNW, 2 June 2010). Interns were told to sign the letters 
by 31 May (SCMP, 30 May 2010). ‘The workers’ defiance was written in red ink. “If you are 
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Chinese you will definitely not sign – one for all and all for one,” a striking Honda employee 
wrote’ on his form (Financial Times, 1 June 2010). This statement weaved together patriotic and 
anti-Japanese sentiments along with worker solidarity. 
 Perhaps sensing that threatening interns would not be sufficient to end the strike – though 
some did resume on Monday 31 May (Open Letter, 3 June 2010) – the company resorted to 
another tactic. On that same day, it allowed up to 200 men wearing union yellow caps, to march 
through the gates into the factory yard.3 These so-called union staff tried to force strikers back to 
their work stations and some videoed the strikers, who then attempted to snatch the cameras, 
resulting in several strikers being roughed up in the general mêlée. One worker shouted: ‘We pay 
union dues every month. You should represent us, so how come you are beating us?’ Another 
said, ‘You’re not listening to the Chinese, but you’re listening to the Japanese’ (SCMP, 1 June 
2010). ‘We wanted to tell the media but most [domestic] news channels were blocked and 
nobody came to report that incident [see below]. So we posted pictures of the clash online 
directly’ (interview 4). By disseminating evidence of this online to other Honda workers in the 
factory and in their dormitories, as well as to outsiders following the dispute, the strikers had 
turned this clash into the equivalent of one of those ‘dramatic public events that seem to cry out 
for an expressive response’ (Rule, 1989: 154).  
 As a result of the attack, several hundred workers who had returned to work stopped 
again and gathered on the basketball court. ‘Special police in steel helmets [then] set up a … 
cordon in front of the factory’s main gate’ (CNW, 2 June 2010). This sent ‘a clear message … 
that the government considered it to be a labour dispute, to be resolved within the factory’ 
(China Labour Bulletin, 2012: 20). In the afternoon, ‘police cordoned off the roads to the factory 
                                                 
3 CNW, 1 June 2010 (this date is wrong), states they had work cards hanging on their chests, saying ‘Shishan 
Union’. ‘According to a cleaner at Nanhai Honda, most are unemployed youth from surrounding villages.’ 
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and turned back busloads of workers who were on their way to start their afternoon shift’ 
(SCMP, 1 June 2010). At one dormitory, a company representative told interns not to go to work 
on Tuesday 1 June in case there was a repeat of Monday’s events;4 some interns had not yet 
signed the contract because of these events (Reuters, 1 June 2010). One 23-year-old said after the 
attack, ‘Now it’s not a matter of pay rises, but upholding our dignity’ (SCMP, 1 June 2010). 
On Tuesday 1 June, 100–200 workers inside the factory went to the gate to appeal to 
foreign reporters about the previous day’s events (Reuters, 1 June 2010). When stoppages took 
place, one of the code-words was ‘factory stroll’;5 on this Tuesday, one message read ‘Today we 
are out on a stroll again’ (Straits Times (Singapore), 10 June 2010). That day, Zeng Qinghong, 
general manager of Guangzhou Automobile Group (a joint venture with Honda) and also a 
National People’s Congress delegate, came to the factory compound to talk to the strikers. At 
first he was abused, but he claimed he was there in his political, not managerial, capacity. The 
strikers had more demands: no dismissal of strikers; a higher pay rise; an explanation from the 
union for its behaviour; and reorganisation of the Nanhai Honda workplace union.  
 At a meeting with worker representatives Zeng Qinghong required the local union to 
apologise in writing by 5.00 pm that day and went to the cafeteria with the worker 
representatives to address 300–400 workers, saying the company would respond to workers’ 
demands within three days. On that basis the strikers agreed to return for three days. The Nanhai 
District Trade Union and Shishan Township Union duly issued a partial ‘apology’ to the Honda 
workers; this was posted all over the factory:  
 
                                                 
4 Financial Times (31 May 2010) reported that ‘shifts have been suspended as negotiations between worker 
representatives, Honda and government mediators continued’. 
5 Béja (2011: 4) uses the term ‘collective walk’. 
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In the process of dialogue with more than 40 employees … there occurred mutual 
misunderstandings and words exchanged … A few exceptional employees became agitated 
and physical altercations occurred with union staff … [A]fter receiving this news some 
workers misunderstood and believed that the union was biased towards the company … If 
there are some aspects of the incident that anyone finds hard to accept, then we express our 
apology … The union stepping forward and urging those employees to go back to work 
was really for the protection of the majority of employees. This is the union’s ultimate 
duty! Each employee, please consider that! … Everyone, please trust the union. Trust 
cadres and the government at each level. We will definitely uphold justice.6 (Open Letter, 
1 June 2010) 
 
Standing up to the union and extracting an apology ‘set a new benchmark for labour activism in 
China’ (China Labour Bulletin, 2011: 4). The union was badly shaken. Chen Weiguang 
(chairman of the Guangzhou Federation of Trade Unions) later argued that it was a mistake to 
issue this letter, especially as when it was posted on the web the union was criticised by ‘the 
whole world’. Rather belatedly, he then tried to dissociate the union from these events by 
claiming that the individuals involved were ‘not trade unionists, but outsiders’, who ‘had hoped 
to end the strike quickly by disguising themselves as trade unionists’ (Global Labour Column 55, 
April 2011). 
   
3.4 Manipulating public opinion, and demobilisation 
 
                                                 
6 This official translation has been slightly modified, after reading the version in Friedman, 2012: 470. 
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[T]echniques … [which ‘appeal to various sentiments of outsiders’] used by … strikers …  
[include] … enduring aggression or wrong without retaliation (Hiller, 1928: 166, 169).  
 
The strikers had apparently agreed two strict rules beforehand, which were a way of framing the 
way they conducted their action as responsible: ‘Damaging machines or facilities at Honda and 
scuffling with people with different opinions, including our management, were strictly prohibited 
… [W]e are telling the public that we are all well-educated people and our fight is reasonable 
and rational’ (SCMP, 16 June 2010). 
 Unprecedented media coverage helped to provide support to strikers and pressure on 
management. The strike had not come to international attention until 27 May when Japanese 
media began reporting the shutdown of Honda’s Chinese assembly plants. Local authorities then 
allowed state-controlled Chinese media to report the strike on 27 and 28 May, with reporters 
(from Beijing, Shanghai and some nearby cities) waiting outside the factory gates, but then 
banned domestic coverage so Chinese reporters disappeared on 29 May, with the authorities 
‘reverting to their usual policy of hushing up labor disputes’ (New York Times, 28, 29, 30 May 
2010; IHT 29 May 2010). It was suggested that exploiting anti-Japanese feeling had made the 
authorities’ decision to allow Chinese reporting a little easier – an example of the government 
wanting ‘to indulge nationalist sentiment’ during strikes at some foreign-owned enterprises 
(Cooke, 2012: 152) – despite concern about the impact of strikes on foreign investment (Chen, 
2010: 109). As noted above and below, the strikers took advantage of the continuing 
international press coverage as well as exploiting the opportunity offered to depict their strike in 
patriotic language. 
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 ‘The QQ group (“Unity is Victory”) and a range of other internet tools allowed workers 
to provide rolling briefings on progress in the strike, enabling reporters to track events and 
lawyers and labour rights activists to give professional advice’ (China Labour Bulletin, 2011: 
14). The strikers posted photos and video footage online before publishing an open letter on the 
internet on 3 June (Open Letter, 3 June 2010). Lüthje (2011: 17) claims this ‘unique document’ 
was ‘widely published in Chinese media and Internet websites’. It referred to the company’s 
large profit ‘created by the sweat and labour of the workers’ and asked management to ‘provide 
time off for the worker representatives to have meetings and collect workers’ opinions’; it 
condemned the local unions, while appealing to all sections of the workforce to elect 
representatives if they had not already done so; and stated to the general public that ‘We are 
concerned with the rights and interests of the workers in the whole country’ (Open Letter, 3 June 
2010). 
That day an international solidarity statement, initiated by the ‘Chinese Workers 
Research Network’, was also posted on the internet (Support Statement), signed by a number of 
academics (mainly from Hong Kong and Taiwan). Finally, the strikers asked a university 
professor to act as labour adviser for what became the final negotiations on 4 June. One source 
suggests that a reporter from Caijing, the Chinese business newspaper, told worker 
representatives he could help them find a lawyer. He then found Professor Chang Kai, of Renmin 
University in Beijing, who agreed to speak to the reporter first about the outcome of the 
negotiations (Wang, 2011: 18). Another source says that Li Xiaojuan, one of the worker 
representatives, called Chang Kai on 3 June; he was impressed that she had found his mobile 
phone number (SCMP, 16 June 2010) but insisted on a formal invitation. 
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 While Zeng Qinghong had been involved in talks with strikers’ representatives during the 
last week of the strike, there was much distrust towards him, especially when he repeated earlier 
management statements that the strike was illegal. He was also unhappy about the strikers’ ‘open 
letter’. Thirty representatives were elected late on the night of 3 June for the next day’s 
negotiations (interview 2). One activist took part in drafting the strikers’ letter and then people 
voted for him (interview 7). Another, a young female worker, Li Xiaojuan, had ‘stood up 
voluntarily so she could represent us from the beginning of the strike as she was very brave’ 
(interview 6). She was welcomed by other women strikers, her courage inspiring them: ‘I 
searched and read a lot of materials during the night before negotiation, though many issues were 
hard to understand. … We found out some legal information and then made summaries … I 
printed out some copies of the laws, but many other delegates did not bother to read them’ 
(interview 8). 
 At the final negotiation, on 4 June 2010, the workplace union’s chair – in a symbolic role 
– chaired negotiations, with five or so of the strikers’ representatives directly involved. Factory 
senior managers, including the general manager, took part in the negotiations directly. The 
workers’ labour adviser acted first as conciliator – trying to bring the sides together – and then as 
mediator, making recommendations to workers to secure a settlement, which included an 
agreement to re-organise the workplace union. The negotiation split into three sessions. After the 
first, it was reported that some workers had stopped work due to the lack of progress. Chang Kai 
thought this was helpful but the workers were persuaded to return. After the second round Chang 
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Kai argued with the representatives to limit their demand to an overall increase of 500 yuan (a 
rise of about one-third above the existing wage) – and this was finally agreed by management.7 
 
4 Postscript and conclusion  
 
Two quotes emphasise the relationship between the strikers and the workplace union: ‘They have 
organised this themselves’ said a workplace union official (Financial Times, 28 May 2010); and 
‘We are doing this ourselves. The [official] union doesn’t represent us’ (Financial Times, 1 June 
2010). The ‘reorganisation’ of the workplace union over the next two years was convoluted, best 
described as ‘creating smoke and mirrors through a complicated electoral process’ (Lau, 2012: 
511). Even nomination to higher committees within the workplace union required agreement by 
its executive committee and the factory’s Communist Party branch, resulting in very little change 
of personnel. Li Xiaojuan, one of the 2010 strikers’ representatives, who was elected to the 
executive committee, quit the factory in August 2011 for further study, and other representatives 
have also left (Lau, 2012: 505). The workplace union had ‘negotiated’ acceptable wage rises in 
2011 and 2012 but the differential increases it agreed in the next wage round led to another 
strike, this time by 100 production-line workers on 18 March 2013, forcing the company, the 
next day, to improve the offer for the lowest paid (Cheung, 2013).  
 Our analysis of the 2010 Nanhai Honda strike has used the framework provided by Hiller 
(1928) because it is unusual in being able to accommodate ‘unorganised’ strikers and the absence 
of an independent trade union. Although written in a very different era, Hiller’s model identifies 
most features of all but short strikes, from preliminary organisation to demobilisation. Far from 
                                                 
7 Wang (2011: 19) claims ‘many workers were dissatisfied with the way outsiders had represented them in the 
negotiations … So the strike continued from June 5 [a Saturday] until June 8, until the management and workers’ 
representatives met once more and reached an agreement directly.’ 
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being an example of Hobsbawm’s (1964) ‘collective bargaining by riot’, as suggested by some 
commentators, the Nanhai Honda strike had very familiar characteristics, found in tens of 
thousands of relatively peaceful strikes in other countries where strikes were not outlawed. It was 
also an example of a particular phenomenon – that a ‘large-scale strike can be triggered by the 
decisive action of only a small number’ (Lane and Roberts, 1971: 225; added emphasis) – and 
our account traced how such a strike was sustained. Meaningful parallels of non-union strikes 
were found within the same industry – the most appropriate level of comparison (Dunlop, 1958: 
25) – where the ‘disruptive power that continuous flow production puts in the hands of workers’ 
in the car industry (Silver, 2003: 92) is potentially immense. 
 One obvious difference from Hiller’s (1928) model was the Nanhai Honda strikers’ use 
of social media (rather than slower more traditional methods) for communication between 
themselves and within the workforce, and (once the foreign press had taken an interest) to the 
outside world. It has been suggested that ‘it was … the degree of publicity and support the strike 
received in the Chinese media that made it [the Nanhai Honda strike] truly remarkable’ (Carter, 
2010b). That publicity was a result of the strategic position the factory occupied within the giant 
multinational Honda’s supply chain and the Chinese authorities’ (temporary) decision to stir up 
anti-Japanese sentiment. Breathing the oxygen of publicity helped the strikers maintain enough 
unity when faced with management efforts to break their solidarity. The Honda strikers’ use of 
social media is only a modern example of ‘manipulating public opinion’ (Hiller, 1928: 10), 
though its successful exploitation is denied to most groups of strikers, particularly in China. 
 There is a substantial modern literature on mobilisation (see Kelly, 1998) and framing 
(Benford and Snow, 2000) but the rudiments of these processes are found in Hiller (1928) and 
have been built upon in our account of the Nanhai Honda strike. Despite its distance in time and 
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place, Hiller’s ‘classic’ text, The Strike: A Study in Collective Action, still provides a robust 
framework for analysing a strike of ‘unorganised’ workers – even in a contemporary Chinese car 
factory.  
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